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Marx's Political Universalism 
 
Harry van der Linden 
 
 
People start small revolutions, but there is not a goal for humanity, there is nothing that interests 
mankind, there are only disruptions.  It is possible to think something like that.  This thought tempts us 
endlessly.... But...I resist, and I know that I will die in hope; but it is necessary to create a foundation 
for this hope (Sartre, 1980, pp. 180-81). 
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
In Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, Michael Walzer argues that although 
people from different countries who fight for better political conditions may share some 
political concerns, their struggles are to be seen as separate "marches" each with their own 
goals rather than as struggles converging toward some final political ideal shared by all.  To 
explicate his view, Walzer recalls a film clip of a political march in Prague during the 
"wonderful year 1989," which showed some protestors carrying signs with only the words 
"truth" or "justice" on them.  Walzer states that he immediately knew what these words 
meant and that he thus at once felt solidarity with the marchers.  On his account, the 
meanings that he grasped were "minimalist" or "thin,” and involved disapproval of fabricated 
news and tyranny as well as a demand for honest leaders and impartial law (Walzer, 1994, p. 
2).  Such "thin" meanings are widely shared and may even be universal; they are abstracted 
from "thick" or "maximalist" meanings, which are detailed and vary from one cultural 
community (with a shared history and identity) to another.  This implies that "while we [can] 
march in spirit with the men and women of Prague, we have in fact our own parade" (p. 8).  In 
other words, once the marchers from Prague or we pursue our own truth and justice, or once 
they or we pursue political values in their maximalist meanings, our normative discourses and 
goals are local and particular.  Walzer concludes that the traditional idea of the left that all the 
different marches will eventually "merge into one grand parade" is to be rejected (p. 9).     
  
Walzer, then, rejects "political universalism," that is, the regulative idea that there is a political 
ideal valid for all human beings.  This idea requires us to strive for a world of a unified 
humanity in which all people will share the same basic political values and participate in 
similar basic ideal institutions.  Political universalism is an aspect of what Walzer in his Tanner 
Lectures (1990) calls "covering-law universalism," which also includes a universalism of 
nonpolitical values.  In his view, covering-law universalists succumb to the illusion that they 
can transcend their own location and particularity and thus arrive at comprehensive universal 
moral or political proposals.  Walzer (1994, pp. 41 ff.) argues that our only "maximalist" task as 
social critics is to develop an internal critique of our own society.  Our task with respect to 
other cultural communities or "tribes" is "minimalist":  We may hope, as Walzer himself does, 
that all the different cultural communities of our world each in their own way will become 
democratic (sharing "thin" democracy), but we can insist only that they recognize each other's 
right to self-determination and seek to settle their often conflicting political aspirations (pp. ix-
x and 81-83). [1]       
 
Walzer's work reflects the pluralist and particularist orientation common to contemporary 
political thought, including that of the left.  The writings of Karl Marx are incompatible with 
this orientation in that they offer a comprehensive political universalism.  For Marx, 
communism is a universal project and its attainment involves that all humans live in 
democratic societies with socialized economies, sharing such values as self-realization through 
creative work, community, and participation.  In The German Ideology (1845-46, p. 57), Marx 
maintains that communism requires a revolution by "the dominant peoples 'all at once' and 
simultaneously."  He later modifies this view, claiming in the Critique of the Gotha Program 
(1875, p. 346) that there will be a first phase of communism prior to full communism, a phase 
"still stamped with the birth-marks of the old society."  Moreover, he grants in a speech that 
workers in some countries "may attain their goal by peaceful means" (Marx, 1872, p. 324).  
Throughout his writings, however, Marx views communism as ultimately a world-historical 
project that requires workers from all nations to set aside their cultural differences and 
become a universal class.  The famous closing words of the Manifesto of the Communist Party 
(1848, p. 98) call for this "grand march": "The proletarians have nothing to lose but their 
chains.  They have a world to win. WORKING MEN OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!"  Marx is 
virtually silent about the role of the social critic, but his own life and work testify that he saw 
the critic's task as anything but local and particularist.  
 
My main aim in this paper is to arrive at a defensible form of Marxian or socialist political 
universalism through a critical examination of Marx's own political universalism.  In the next 
section, I will outline several moral errors that Walzer ascribes to political universalism, 
including Marx's, and show that Walzer largely misdirects his criticisms because what primarily 
accounts for Marx committing the errors is his Hegelian metaphysical conception of history, 
not his political universalism as such.  In the third section, I will propose some modifications of 
Marx's philosophical anthropology as a step toward meeting Walzer's epistemic objection that 
the attempt to formulate a universal political ideal is pointless because it is inevitably marred 
by one's particularist and local perspective.  I will sketch in the fourth section an alternative 
conception of history, a critical universal history, that avoids the moral errors of Marx's 
metaphysical conception.  In conclusion I will briefly argue that to effect progressive change in 
our global economy, we need a political universalist orientation rather than Walzer's pluralist 
approach.  
 
 
2. Metaphysical Universal History 
 
Walzer's normative criticisms of political universalism boil down to three errors that he thinks 
the political universalist is bound to make.  The first is that the universalist judges the political, 
economic, or cultural endeavors of people solely in terms of their contribution to the alleged 
final political ideal, with the result that historical events outside the "main march" are seen as 
without any real value.  Walzer explicitly ascribes this error to Marx.  Discussing the covering-
law universalism of imperialist Christian nations, he writes:  
 
The Lord's servants stand in the center of history, constitute its main current, while the 
histories of the others are so many chronicles of ignorance and meaningless strife.  Indeed, 
there is a sense in which they have no history at all -- as in the Hegelian/ Marxist conception -- 
since nothing of world-historical significance has happened to them (Walzer, 1990, pp. 511-
12).   
 
For Walzer, no march has world-historical significance, whether it be the 1989 demonstrations 
in Prague, the long march of the Chinese communists, or Israel's exodus from Egypt (Walzer, 
1994, p. 9).  Instead, we should view history as what Odo Marquard (1991, p. 51) calls a 
"multiversal history."  Walzer states: "The exodus from Egypt liberates only Israel, only the 
people whose exodus it was.... [T]here is no universal history, but rather a series of 
histories...in each of which value can be found" (Walzer, 1990, p. 514). 
 
The second practical error of political universalism is misguided pride and absolute moral 
confidence about the rightness of one's cause.  The covering-law universalists take themselves 
to be "the chosen, the elect, the true believers, the vanguard" (Walzer, 1990, p. 512).  The two 
errors contribute to the final and most serious error: The political universalist tends to accept 
or even support oppressive practices viewed as conducive to the realization of the final 
political ideal.  Walzer sees this error exemplified in Marx's articles on India.  Marx held that 
although England caused immense suffering in India by destroying its traditional village 
system, it also unwittingly served the interest of humanity by modernizing and industrializing 
India.  He wrote:  
 
[C]an mankind fulfill its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?  If 
not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the unconscious tool of history in 
bringing about that revolution. [So] we have the right...to exclaim with Goethe: 'Should this 
torture [of India] then torment us, Since it brings us greater pleasure?  Were not through the 
rule of Timur, Souls devoured without measure?'" (Marx, 1853, p. 307).   
 
Walzer (1990, p. 542) comments that Marx's view here rests on the wrong "belief that 
mankind has a single destiny, which all its members must alike 'fulfill'."  Moreover, his 
"benevolent intention" assumes that the victims "are dim, unenlightened, barbarian, ignorant, 
and passive" and are "helplessly waiting to be rescued by the more advanced nations" (p. 
543).  
    
In my view, Walzer correctly points to some serious moral errors in Marx, but explains them in 
the wrong way: Their real source is Marx's Hegelian understanding of historical progress, not 
his political universalism as such.  It seems that Walzer goes wrong partly because he conflates 
Marx's political universalism and his Hegelian conception of history.  I will proceed to outline 
Marx's Hegelian conception and show that it leads him not only to commit the errors that 
Walzer notes but some other moral errors as well.      
For Hegel, history is the unfolding of Reason, or the process through which Reason becomes 
aware of its own essence.  This implies that history loses its contingency and becomes 
meaningful, and even justified, as a process of human emancipation, for Reason or Mind can 
only attain self-awareness through the finite human mind.  It also implies that Reason acquires 
full self-knowledge through Hegel's work, or, as Leszek Kolakowski (1978, p. 60) puts it, his 
work is the "Mind's autobiography."  The unfolding of Reason requires a growth of human 
freedom, and Hegel argues that Reason uses "world-historical figures" to bring about higher 
forms of the state that guarantee this freedom.  The process culminates in constitutional 
monarchy in which civil servants are the "universal class" with the task of promoting "the 
universal interests of the community" (Hegel, 1821, p. 132). 
 
Marx takes over Hegel's schema (see also Van der Linden, 1988, 260ff.): Communism, as 
articulated in his own work, is "the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be the 
solution."  Marx continues: "The entire movement of history is...the actual act of creation of 
communism" (Marx, 1844a, p. 348).  Analogous to Hegel's self-realizing journey of the Mind, 
this movement starts with primitive communism, goes through a long history of alienated 
existence, and culminates in mediated or self-conscious communism.  History, then, is 
communist humanity coming into existence, and leads to "the complete restoration of man to 
himself as a social being" (p. 348).  The proletariat must execute the final step of humanity's 
recovery of its social nature on a higher plane.  Marx's first statement of this idea is primarily a 
Hegelian philosophical deduction (cf. Kolakowski, 1978, p. 130).  Marx (1843-44, p. 256) 
searches for the "universal class" whose emancipation will constitute the emancipation of 
humanity and argues that a class that is totally negated by society, or is "the total loss of 
humanity," is the universal class because its emancipation as the negation of the negation will 
be "the total redemption of humanity."  Marx concludes that the proletariat is this universal 
class, even though he had at the time little empirical knowledge of the proletariat.    
  
Both Hegel and Marx offer a history of humanity, or a universal history, that is based on a 
metaphysical or dogmatic teleology, not on a critical teleology in Kant's sense; for the telos of 
history is seen as immanent to, and constitutive or determinative of, history.  At some places 
in his work, Marx explicitly rejects such a teleology, stating, for example, that history is 
"speculatively distorted" when "later history is made the goal of earlier history" (Marx, 1845-
46, p. 58).  Yet, Marx never totally freed himself from Hegel's influence here, and throughout 
his writings he supplements or substitutes causal explanations and predictions by statements 
to the effect that certain events inevitably will occur, or simply had to occur, because they 
constitute a necessary link in history as the unfolding of communism. [2]  One example of this 
is that Marx on basis of his philosophical deduction of the historic mission of the proletariat 
argues that this mission "is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole 
proletariat, at this moment regards as its aim"; rather, "[i]t is a question of "what the 
proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will historically be compelled to do" 
(Marx, 1844c, p. 47).  One problem here is that Marx in effect protects his view of the future 
role of the working class from modification or refutation by his own later empirical research.  
 
 
Jon Elster (1985) provides numerous other examples of how Marx's metaphysical teleology 
had a distorting effect on his otherwise path-breaking empirical research.  My main concern, 
however, is its negative normative implications.  A first consequence is the misplaced moral 
confidence that Walzer detects in Marx, which, I think, helps to explain the latter's moral 
mistake of treating many socialists, including Proudhon, Weitling, Lassalle, and Bakunin, in a 
contemptuous manner, both in person and writing.  The contempt partly rests on Marx's 
conviction that they lacked insight into the true course of history, whereas he had solved the 
riddle of history and knew its direction.  Replying to a letter in which Marx had attacked a 
fellow socialist, Proudhon perceptively wrote back: "[L]et us show the world an example of a 
learned and far-sighted tolerance; but simply because we are at the head of a movement, let 
us not set ourselves up as the leaders of a new intolerance" (cited in Wilson, 1940, pp. 154-
55).  The plea fell on deaf ears, and intolerant polemics all too often have characterized 
Marxism since its inception. 
 
Marx's misplaced moral certainty also seems a factor in his ultimate acceptance of the 
oppression and suffering that the British inflicted on India, for this harm is conceived as one 
that is destined to lead toward the good.  What further facilitates this attitude is that Marx 
follows Hegel in seeing history as a cunning and retributive process.  Hegel maintains that the 
world-historical figures, such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, and Napoleon, "trample 
down many an innocent flower," but when their task is done "they fall off like empty hulls 
from the kernel": They die young, are murdered or exiled, while the Spirit triumphs because 
the state has evolved into a higher form (Hegel, 1822-31, pp. 31-33).  Marx states his version 
of the "cunning of reason" in the Manifesto, whereby the bourgeoisie and the productive 
forces fulfill roles analogous to Hegel's world-historical figures and the state, respectively.  
Competition among capitalists forces them to continuously expand the productive forces and 
exploit the proletariat.  This creates the material conditions for communist society, as well as 
the impulse for revolution, and so the bourgeoisie cannot help but produce "its own grave-
diggers" (Marx, 1848, p. 79).  Elsewhere, Marx (1856, p. 300) sums up the matter by stating 
that "History is the judge -- its executioner, the proletarian."  We may assume that Marx also 
saw this retributive justice appear on the horizon in India, viewing the Sepoy mutiny of 1857 
as foreshadowing it.  He wrote in response to this rebellion that "[t]here is something in 
human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be 
forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself" (Marx, 1857, 353).   
 
Marx's error of disvaluing historical events outside or against the unfolding of communism can 
also be traced back to Hegel, who describes events outside Reason's march as deserted by the 
living Spirit; these events are actual, but not real (wirklich).  Hence, Marx (1853, p. 306) echoes 
Hegel when he states that Indian village life before the arrival of British capitalism harbored 
"undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life."  No doubt, Marx's judgment partly simply 
reflects a lack of empirical knowledge on his side (cf. Chandra, 1981, pp. 13, 32, 47), but the 
point is that his Hegelian notion of progress predisposes him to his erroneous view of India.  
For Marx, the productive forces are "real," as is reflected in his materialist conception of 
history (cf. Singer, 1980, pp. 41-42) and his praise for the bourgeoisie as having created "more 
massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding generations together" 
(Marx, 1848, p. 72).  India before British colonialism was outside the "real" movement of 
history.  So were most people in Europe until the bourgeoisie through the creation of large 
cities "rescued a considerable part of the population from the idiocy of rural life" (p. 71).  Marx 
further describes peasants of his own time as "reactionary" because they "try to roll back the 
wheel of history" (p. 77). On his account, then, it is better to be in the center of history, to be 
"living" and exploited, than to be outside or in opposition to history's course, to be deserted 
or "dead."   
 
Going beyond Walzer, it should be noted that Marx's metaphysical universal history also 
invites a misguided evaluation of struggles that are progressive on his own account in that 
they are judged in instrumentalist terms only.  Marx comes close to making this mistake in a 
speech to radical workers in London, stating that from the angle of the future proletarian 
revolution the "so-called Revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents," and that "[s]team, 
electricity, and the self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous character 
than even citizens Barbès, Raspail and Blanqui" (Marx, 1856, p. 299).  Here Marx certainly 
displays little sensitivity toward people who with great harm to themselves sought to improve 
the condition of the working class:  The productive forces are seen as more significant 
instruments in bringing about the final ideal. [3]  
     
So the problem is that the historian who adopts a Marxian metaphysical teleology might rob 
historical agents of their dignity, reducing them to means only.  Relatedly, how can Marxian 
historical agents avoid seeing themselves this way?  Another moral shortcoming of Marx's 
Hegelian dialectical view of history is that it predisposes him to the view that the 
emancipation of the proletariat (as the negation of the negation) must take place through 
revolution and will be motivated by immediate need or self-interest without considerations of 
justice.  The result is that moral reflection on the means of emancipation becomes irrelevant. 
More broadly, Marx's metaphysical teleology encourages one to see practical choices as only 
theoretical problems of determining the future course of history.  Marx made this error when 
he dismissed peasant struggles as "reactionary" because they go against the "wheel of 
history."  In the Manifesto, he also includes in this dismissal the struggles by shopkeepers, 
small manufacturers, and artisans.  A familiar tragedy of the communist movement is that 
many communists left it to their leaders to figure out the course of history and thus determine 
the direction of their future political actions.  The rank and file members relinquished their 
own independent moral judgment and undermined their integrity.  
 
Political pluralism does not really solve these moral errors that Marx himself committed or 
that his work promoted: Local metaphysical histories may involve that basically the same 
errors are repeated within each local framework.  This underlines that Walzer's normative 
objections to political universalism is misdirected.  This critique only shows that Marx's 
metaphysical teleology must be rejected.  I will sketch in the fourth section a more adequate 
conception of history -- a critical universal history -- in accordance with the communist 
political ideal.   
 
 
 
3. Shared Humanity  
 
Marx uses his anthropology of the 1844 Manuscripts both to criticize capitalist society and to 
formulate his communist alternative.  For Marx (1844a, 348), communism is "the true 
appropriation of the human essence through and for man."  The appropriation of the human 
essence "through man" involves both a humanization of our "natural being" and a 
naturalization of our "human being."  Our "human being" consists of our distinctively human 
capacities or powers, and communist individuals will use these powers to make the functions 
that they share with other animals (their "natural being") distinctly human.  Their "human 
being" will be naturalized in that they will express their uniquely human capacities in material 
objects and feel also no opposition between their natural and distinctly human powers.  The 
appropriation of the human essence will be "for man" in that projects of self-realization in 
communist society will be mutually enriching and affirming rather than mutually restricting, as 
in capitalist society (Marx, 1844b, pp. 277-78).  
     
Marx believes that in all societies thus far our powers have been realized in an incomplete and 
distorted manner.  One reason for this is that "not only the five senses, but also the so-called 
spiritual senses, the practical senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, the human sense, the 
humanity of the senses -- all these come into being only through the existence of their objects, 
through humanized nature (Marx, 1844a, 353).  So only "the society that is fully developed 
produces man in all the richness of his being" (p. 354).  What is further at stake is that all 
societies have been oppressive, leaving most individuals with few opportunities to develop 
their capabilities and distorting the humanity of everyone's senses.  Marx focuses on capitalist 
society and how it with its division of labor has stunted the individual and social development 
of workers.  He also notes that in capitalism everyone is estranged from their senses because 
objects are enjoyed only if owned (pp. 351-52). 
 
Since Marx holds that there is a shared humanity, or a set of essential human powers, his 
anthropology offers a standard for comparatively assessing societies across cultures or time.  
The standard is the degree and scope of the realization of our essential capabilities and is an 
important element of the critical universal history that I will sketch later.  Marx, however, did 
not provide a systematic and detailed explication of our essential capabilities, and so his 
anthropology must be elaborated and improved.  The recent work of Martha Nussbaum is 
promising for this purpose.   
 
Following Aristotle's idea that the good society must provide for the conditions of good 
human functioning, Nussbaum argues on basis of an "Aristotelian political conception" for 
social democracy.  She claims that Marx adhered to the same political conception (Nussbaum, 
1988, pp. 183-84), but draws less from his work, presumably because he did not fully explicate 
this conception.  Her argument proceeds in three steps.  The first is a formulation of "the 
constitutive circumstances of the human being."  Here Nussbaum (1990) seeks to state 
defining features of human life that are shared by people across cultures and time.  The 
second step is to formulate on basis of these universal features a list of "basic human 
functional capabilities."  The final step is to sketch the institutions that --for our time -- 
optimally enable everyone to develop fully their basic capabilities according to their own 
choices.    
    
Some constitutive elements of human life are that we are mortal, have bodies in need of food, 
drink, shelter, and movement, have sexual desire, are able to experience pleasure and pain, 
and need care and protection of others for our initial growth (Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 219-22).  
For Marx, these elements are aspects of our "natural being," and what characterizes "man" as 
"natural being" is that "the objects of his drives exist outside him as objects independent of 
him," forcing him to appropriate them (Marx, 1844a, p. 389).  Additional constitutive elements 
of human life are sense-perception, imagination, thinking, the feeling of concern for and 
connectedness to other humans, and the sense of being part of nature.  Marx (1844a) 
describes all but the first of these as distinctively human characteristics, arguing that what 
distinguishes us from other animals is that we engage in self-conscious, free, and planned 
work in cooperation with others, use all of nature as our field of operation, produce according 
to the standard inherent in each thing, and thus also produce "in accordance with the laws of 
beauty" (p. 329).  Only Nussbaum (1990, pp. 222-23) stresses as defining human experiences 
that we feel separate from others (living our own life), desire some private space and things 
for ourselves, laugh and play, and use practical reason in managing our own lives and 
reflecting on what is good and right.     
    
Nussbaum (1990, p. 225) derives the following list of basic human functional capabilities 
(stated in abbreviated and paraphrased form): (1) Being able to live a complete life; (2) being 
able to move, have good health, adequate food, shelter, and sexual opportunities; (3) being 
able to avoid needless pains and have pleasures; (4) being able to imagine, think, and use all 
the senses; (5) being able to develop attachments to things and persons; (6) being able to use 
practical reason; (7) being able to live with and for others; (8) being able to relate to nature; 
(9) being able to laugh and play; and, (10) being able to live one's own life in one's own 
setting.  For Nussbaum, a life lacking any one of these functional capabilities falls significantly 
short in humanness (p. 225).  She also argues that (6) and (7) have an "architectonic role in 
human life, suffusing and also organizing all the other functions -- which will count only as 
truly human functions only in so far as they are done with some degree of guidance from both 
of these" (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 266). [4] So it is, for example, in the planning of a meal and 
enjoying it with others that our need for food is truly humanized.     
 
It is not crucial for my purpose here to discuss how Nussbaum argues for social democracy 
from the general claim that a good society must enable citizens to function well in terms of 
the ten capabilities.  Instead, it should be noted what Marxian political thought can gain from 
her work.  To begin, Marx offers a too-limited account of how to arrive at an explication of our 
shared humanity.  He claims that it is how we produce that sets us apart from other animals, 
but then further restricts this approach by stating that industry is "the open book of the 
essential powers of man" (Marx, 1844a, p. 354).  Nussbaum (1992, pp. 215-16) holds that we 
can derive the constitutive elements of human life from the actual self-understandings of 
people in different times and cultures, especially from their stories and myths concerned with 
reflecting on what defines our humanity.  Her approach leads her to neglect that the very fact 
that we meet our needs and acquire new needs through social labor is a fundamental aspect 
of our humanness. [5]  On the other hand, Marx's focus on industry, and even his broader 
focus on productive activity (which also includes, for example, art and music), leads him to pay 
inadequate attention to the importance to human life of our capacity (6) to use practical 
reason, and especially moral reason.  Two correlated mistakes are that Marx thinks that the 
emancipation (socialization) of labor will automatically lead to human emancipation, and that 
he describes full communist society as beyond justice and rights (Marx, 1875, pp. 346-47).  
Our "separateness" by itself already shows the inadequacy of this description in that rights are 
needed to protect our capacity (10) to live our own lives.  Marx, however, seems to have 
believed that communism would dissolve all conflicts between the self and others.  A final way 
in which Marx's view of human flourishing should be broadened is that he underestimated our 
need (9) for play and leisure.   
      
Nussbaum's procedure of arguing from human capabilities to ideal institutions points to 
Marx's failure to discuss in any detail the institutions that enable optimal human functioning.  
His Hegelian understanding of progress helps to explain why he failed to see that elaborated 
visions of political ideals are important to motivating and directing emancipatory struggles (cf. 
Lukes, 1985, p. 43).  One specific shortcoming of Marx's vision is that he both suggests that 
human self-realization will take place through material production (in contrast to alienated 
work in capitalist society) and that the "realm of necessity" must be reduced as much as 
possible so that free human development will be maximized outside production (Marx, 1863-
67, p. 820).  He was also unclear about the market and economic planning in communist 
society.  Moreover, Marx never really explained how the communist state could lose its 
"political character," and, yet, retain elections, engage in planning, and provide for collective 
goods (Marx, 1874, p. 336; 1875, p. 345).  Recent Marxists (see Bardhan, 1993; Roemer, 1994) 
have done much to overcome what Irving Howe rightly described as "an intellectual scandal," 
namely, "[socialism's] paucity of thought regarding the workings of socialist society" (cited in 
Lukes, 1985, p. 46, from Dissent, 1981, 493).  However, some of the recent proposals assume 
that what primarily makes communism (socialism) superior to liberal capitalism is greater 
equality in the distribution of material resources.  A Marxian approach that emphasizes good 
human functioning may make a stronger case for communism by also arguing, for example, on 
basis of capabilities (6), (7), and creative productivity for workplace democracy.  Moreover, a 
normative framework of good functioning will more directly focus our attention on the 
question of how socialism can overcome the obsessive consumption patterns of capitalism.  
 
It is clear that the formulation of universal ideal political institutions is an ongoing task, but is 
the task misguided, as Walzer claims?  The weakness of Walzer's own pluralism shows the 
strength of political universalism.  Consider his discussion of another important political event 
of 1989, the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square.  Walzer argues that the solidarity he felt 
with the Chinese students underlines his own pluralist view because the basis of this feeling 
was a minimalist rejection of tyranny, not a maximalist support of their different view of 
democracy (Walzer, 1994, pp. 59-60).  Walzer continues to state that if he were invited to 
lecture about democracy to the students he would tell them what the idea means to him, and 
he "would try to avoid the missionizing tone, for my views include the idea that democracy in 
China will have to be Chinese -- and my explanatory powers do not reach to what that means" 
(p. 60).  In response, it should be first of all noted that the political universalist who sees the 
formulation of ideal institutions as an ongoing task would certainly not proceed in a 
missionizing tone.  To the contrary, the universalist would listen carefully to the Chinese 
students, for, unlike Walzer, she assumes that she and her audience share a substantive 
common humanity and that they might have proposals that increase her understanding of 
how democratic institutions can improve human functioning.  [In fact, the democratic 
struggles of 1989 stimulated renewed interest in democracy in Western Europe and the U.S.]  
Further, what can the Chinese students gain from Walzer if he is right that we are all deeply 
embedded in thick moralities and only share abstracted thin or minimalist moralities?  If he 
cannot contribute to the formulation of Chinese democracy, how can his audience grasp and 
assess his American democracy?  It is only really important for the students to hear Walzer if 
they assume that his thick conception of democracy can significantly (not just in a "thin" 
manner) become their own.  Walzer wrongly places the emphasis: The issue is not Chinese 
democracy, but Chinese democracy.  The universal is "thick" here, while the particular is 
"thin."  And, of course, the political universalist has no stake in denying that the same basic 
institutions may have local variations.  Rather, she only assumes that the more people are 
freely creating their own societies and debating with each other which institutional 
arrangements are best the more their basic institutions will converge.  The views of the 
participants will be deeply influenced by their traditions, but their shared humanity can both 
sustain and direct the debate.     
   
4. Critical Universal History 
 
The fundamental philosophical premise of critical universal history, as based on Kant's critical 
historical teleology, is that the ideal of a humanity unified through common basic political 
institutions and shared values may be postulated as the goal of history, but this goal must be 
seen as setting a task for empirical humanity, not as a goal determinative or constitutive of 
history -- except, of course, when empirical humanity finally makes the postulated goal its 
own. [6] Like the metaphysical historian, the critical historian recognizes that in light of the 
(postulated) goal of history the past has led to unintended progress, but the critical historian 
denies that unintended good consequences in any way justify oppressive practices and are to 
be seen as inevitable moments in the unfolding of the good.  Now precisely because the future 
is open according to the critical historian, despair may emerge:  Will empirical humanity ever 
take on the task of promoting the goal of history?  In the words of Sartre (cited earlier), what 
creates despair is that perhaps "there is nothing that interests mankind, there are only 
disruptions."  This despair undermines the hope that we might derive from humanity's 
tremendously increased technological abilities to provide a decent life for all.    
 
A primary task of critical universal history is to recover or support hope through showing that 
empirical humanity is concerned with the ideal of a unified humanity.  Kant sought to do this 
on basis of the enthusiasm that the French Revolution (in its early stages) generated among its 
spectators.  On his account, this enthusiasm showed that there is a "moral tendency of the 
human race" because it was directed toward international peace and the liberal state as the 
political ends promoted by the Revolution, and these ends facilitate the realization of a unified 
humanity, or the kingdom of ends (Kant, 1798, pp. 182-83).  Kant did not deny that the 
revolutionaries in their initial enthusiasm had similar moral concerns, but this would be harder 
to establish because their self-interest was at stake in their struggle, while the enthusiasm of 
the spectators was against their own self-interest due oppressive responses by their 
governments.  Another reason for turning to the spectators is that this grounds hope: The 
spectators, including those of future generations, might become the new revolutionaries 
when suitable conditions for political change occur once again.  Marx (against his "Hegelian 
self") also sought to reveal the universal in the particular historical event.  His event is the 
Paris Commune, "the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economic 
emancipation of labor" (Marx, 1871, p. 212).  Marx sees the revolutionaries as deeply 
committed to this goal: "Working, thinking, fighting, bleeding Paris -- almost forgetful, in its 
incubation of a new society, of the cannibals at its gates -- radiant in the enthusiasm of its 
historic initiative!" (p. 220).  For the same reason as Kant, Marx is also concerned with the 
spectators, stating in the closing words of The Civil War in France that "[w]orking men's Paris, 
with its Commune, will be forever celebrated as the glorious harbinger of a new society.  Its 
martyrs are enshrined in the great heart of the working class" (p. 233).    
                      
Critical universal history grounds hope but offers no guarantee for progress.  Historical 
certainty or optimism presumes a metaphysical view of progress.  To be sure, it is important to 
examine the social conditions that make progressive collective action possible and successful -
- Marx was right to emphasize this in opposition to the utopian socialists -- but, as the events 
of 1989 in Eastern Europe confirm once again, we are not really able to predict when such 
conditions will occur.  Another comparative strength of critical universal history is that it 
upholds the dignity of historical agents.  The historical actors are not evaluated in terms of 
their political success, or viewed as a link in the road toward the ideal.  Rather, the critical 
historian will esteem the historical actors because they were inspired by the ideal of a unified 
humanity and tried to promote it.  Here critical universal history places an important -- but in 
the Marxist tradition, often neglected or dismissed -- moral limiting constraint on 
emancipatory struggle: The historian can only illuminate the ideal of a unified humanity in the 
historical event if the actors do not deny this ideal through their own actions.  Ernst Toller, one 
of the leaders of the last phase of the Munich Revolution of 1918-19, provides the guideline: 
"We were demanding humanity, and we had to show humanity ourselves" (cited in Keck, 
1975, p. 421).  Following this guideline, politically committed individuals can uphold their 
dignity in the face of progress, for they share a common ideal and intention with their 
historians.  Revolutionary politics of terror, to the contrary, obscure the vision of the ideal (cf. 
Sartre, 1980, pp. 174-75), and the revolutionaries in their attempt to justify terror for the sake 
of the good reduce themselves to what a metaphysical history tends to make all individuals 
who struggle for emancipation: "means only."   
  
The works of Kant and Marx illustrate that there exist different explications of the ideal of a 
unified humanity, especially with regard to the basic political institutions of the ideal.  This 
does not undermine, however, the task of critical history to support hope, nor does it pose a 
threat for the dignity of historical actors.  We have noted that there is significant cross-cultural 
and historical continuity in what counts as basic elements of human flourishing, and this 
continuity makes it possible for critical historians and historical actors with different 
conceptions of the ideal of a unified humanity to engage in a moral dialogue, actually or 
counterfactually, concerning its most adequate articulation.  The historians and the actors 
share a concern for a humanity that seeks to promote the good human functioning of all, and 
their dialogue about this ideal safeguards that historical actors receive the memory that is 
owed to them in light of their emancipatory efforts.  The dialogue may also be a source of 
hope: There is progress in the articulation of the ideal of a unified humanity.   
  
It can now readily be seen that Marx's political universalism, conjoined with a critical universal 
history, avoids the errors that Walzer ascribes to it.  Had Marx been a critical historian, he 
would not have tolerated the "crimes" of England in India on the ground that England was 
"the unconscious tool of history" in bringing about India's ultimate emancipation, for this 
prediction is based on a metaphysical teleology that goes beyond the limits of reason 
(knowledge).  Also, and more importantly, the critical socialist historian is committed to the 
view that the means of progress must reflect her political ideal.  Kant sets the example: He 
vehemently condemned the commercial exploitation of non-Western nations by the European 
nations, even though he also noted that capitalist trade may in the long run be conducive to 
political liberty and international peace.  The "critical" Kant (1795, pp. 106-07) writes that 
"China and Japan, having had experience of such guests, have wisely placed restrictions on 
them"; the "metaphysical" Marx (1848, p. 71), however, notes with approval that "the cheap 
prices of [the bourgeoisie's] commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all 
Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians' intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to 
capitulate."  
 
The critical universal historian also will not commit the error of pride and misguided moral 
certainty, recognizing that the formulation of the socialist ideal is an ongoing task.  Further, 
she will not make the error of disvaluing events outside the "main march."  One reason for this 
is that she denies the very notion of a main or single road toward the political ideal, seeing 
universal significance in many "marches."  Marx made a step in the right direction when he 
granted that communism may be realized through parliamentary reform in some countries 
(Marx, 1872), and when he proposed that in the event of a Russian revolution the Russian 
peasant commune could be a crucial contribution to the emancipation of labor (Marx, 1881).  
Even small historical events may have universal meaning.  Marx (1844a, p. 365) himself offers 
the example of how "the brotherhood of man" is visible in the meetings of French socialist 
workers.  Last, the purpose of critical universal history must be kept in view:  To support the 
commitment to universal political praxis by showing that empirical humanity is concerned 
with the ideal of a unified humanity.  There are many valuable activities, political or otherwise, 
that simply fall outside the perspective of universal history, but that does not make them less 
valuable.    
 
What distinguishes the critical universal historian and the multiversal historian, then, is not 
that the universal historian claims that "marches" lack value simply because they are only of 
local or particular significance, but rather that the multiversal historian denies that "marches" 
may have universal significance.  It seems, however, implausible to view the French Revolution 
and the Paris Commune as primarily local events, or as having thick meaning for only the 
French "parade."  Likewise, the events of 1989 are more than occasions of "minimalist" 
solidarity, no matter how deeply felt.  The immediate spectators of the French Revolution and 
the Paris Commune were still relatively local; the world-wide response to the events of 1989 
provides us with the hope that a world public concerned with universal human emancipation 
is forming.        
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
 
My main focus thus far has been to try to show that a socialist political universalist perspective 
is tenable and offers a good interpretive framework for history.  Let me conclude by arguing 
that progressive change in our world requires a political universalist approach instead of 
Walzer's pluralist orientation.  A first problem with Walzer's view is that he holds that social 
critics should limit their maximalist critiques to their own cultural communities, and they may 
only launch minimalist critiques of other cultural communities.  On his account, "[s]ocial critics 
[should] mostly work out of a Home Office" (Walzer, 1994, p. 49).  Who is, however, to 
determine what counts as the home office?  Walzer's reasoning invites an endless 
multiplication of cultural communities that reject "maximalist" criticisms of their mode of life 
as "external."  Walzer is unclear concerning the possible content of "minimalist critiques," but 
it seems that only cultural communities that engage in gross violations of human rights or are 
belligerent fall within the scope of this critique.  So Walzer's pluralism undermines rigorous 
substantive political debate in the public sphere, whether it be local, national, or international, 
and thus eliminates an emancipatory source for cultural communities with modes of life 
antithetical to human flourishing.  Socialist political universalism, to the contrary, holds that 
no cultural communities are exempt from normative criticisms in terms of how well they allow 
the development of our human capabilities.     
  
Even though Walzer (1994) maintains that "[t]he crucial commonality of the human race is 
particularism: we participate, all of us, in thick cultures that are our own" (p. 83), he also notes 
that "[c]onfronted with modernity, all the human tribes are endangered species" (p. 72).  He 
adds that there is a right "to build walls against contemporary culture," but that the political 
recognition of this right "cannot guarantee the success of the resistance."  Walzer's insistence 
on our inevitable cultural particularity, then, is partly wishful thinking in that he fears that our 
world is becoming increasingly culturally homogeneous.  I do not share Walzer's sense that all 
cultures are intrinsically valuable and deserve to be preserved; rather, cultural change for the 
sake of fuller human flourishing is desirable.  However, the rich and diverse self-realized 
individual envisioned by Marx presumes cultural diversity (cf. Kain, 1993, pp. 245ff.), and the 
dreams of global corporations of a world-wide cultural homogeneity are indeed nightmares 
(cf. Barnet, 1994).  But how can we prevent the emergence of a superficial universal culture 
centered around the consumption of goods that are produced and aggressively marketed by 
global corporate giants?  How can other harms that these corporations inflict, such as global 
environmental destruction, depletion of resources, the violation of basic rights in the 
workplace, subsistence wages in the Third World, and the breakdown of local communities 
everywhere through capital flight, be prevented?  
  
Marx rightly stressed that the emancipation of the working class required the formation of 
solidarity among workers, both within individual states and across states, and he correctly saw 
that nationalism is antithetical to this goal.  Marx's mistake was that he generally 
underestimated the depth of nationalist feelings among the working class.   Walzer's work is 
an antidote to this mistake, but falls into the opposite trap of describing each of us as "locked" 
in our particular cultural communities.  Thus his work blocks off the road toward the kind of 
very close international human cooperation that is needed to address the harms inflicted by 
the giant global capitalist companies.  Andrew Collier (1992, p. 90) calls, for the sake of this 
purpose, for a "new internationalism" among workers of all nations; more broadly, what is 
necessary is a "globalization from below" consisting of intense cooperation between human 
rights groups, peace movements, feminist groups, environmental movements, consumer 
protection groups, etc. from across the globe (Brecher, 1994).  Cooperation between these 
groups may locally control or prevent corporate abuses, but, more importantly, it is needed to 
pressure national governments into adopting far-reaching international economic and 
environmental agreements -- covering investments, corporate taxation, workers’s rights, 
minimum wage, safety standards, pollution standards, etc. --  that enable local communities 
everywhere to shape their own future (cf. Robinson, 1995, p. 380).  Regional economic and 
environmental agreements are also needed.  From a socialist perspective, the ideal of 
flourishing communities ultimately requires that the means of production are socialized and 
come under democratic control, and this aim would necessitate even greater global 
cooperation.  It is clear, however, that even modest steps toward improved lives for all human 
beings demand that social critics and activists from all nations come to think and work 
together, not in a "minimalist" fashion, as Walzer would have it, but in a "maximalist" way.   
   
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1.  Walzer (1990) calls his own view reiterative universalism, reflecting that the different 
cultural communities reiterate self-determination, justice, truth, etc., in their "thin" or 
"minimalist" meanings.  I find this terminology somewhat confusing in that the basic content 
of what is reiterated is particular.  I will use the term "political pluralism" to refer to Walzer's 
view, but it should be noted that his pluralism is a "modest" one. 
 
2.  Cf. Lukes, 1985, pp. 43-44, and Elster, 1985, pp. 109ff.  Elster speculates that the strong 
rejection of historical teleology in The German Ideology (just cited) is due to Engels (as co-
author of this work).  Elster explains: "Although capable of wild flights of fancy, Engels may 
have had a more sober attitude towards history than did Marx, corresponding to his better 
judgment concerning specific historical events" (pp. 109-10).  I would like to suggest a more 
fundamental explanation:  Marx spent many more years than Engels, and with much more 
depth, studying and criticizing Hegel prior to turning to communism and the study of 
economics (cf. McLellan, 1978, 98-99).  So we may assume that Hegel's teleology had a greater 
impact on Marx. 
       
3.  Barbès, Blanqui, Raspail were leaders of the Paris working class and received long jail terms 
for their role in the Revolution of 1848.  Barbès was a religious socialist, Blanqui espoused a 
"revolutionary voluntarism," while Raspail has become best known for promoting social 
medicine and prison reform.  
  
4.  Nussbaum's emphasis on practical reason means that there is a significant overlap between 
Kantianism and her Aristotelianism, especially so for a left Kantianism that argues that society 
must provide for the material and institutional conditions that enable a life of moral 
autonomy.  Some differences between the two approaches can be inferred from her 
interesting criticisms of John Rawls. See Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 210-13, 227-28, 242-43; 1992, 
pp. 233-34. 
   
5.  Nussbaum claims that monotonous and mindless work goes against good human 
functioning.  She does not fully explain why this is so, but it seems that the reason is that such 
work blocks capabilities (4), (6), and (7).  See Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 230-31.  What she does not 
argue, however, is that the capacity for free labor is a basic feature of human life.    
    
6.  I discuss most of the issues in this section in more detail in Van der Linden, 1988, Ch. III, 
sections 1 and 3, and Ch. VII, section 3.   
 
7.  An important exception is that Marx argued in a letter to Engels (12/10/1869) that the 
nationalist conflict between English and Irish workers in England prevented the emancipation 
of both of them.  See further Gilbert, 1980, pp. 197ff. 
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